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1 Introduction
In most federations, central governments transfer funds to regional and local governments.
The di¤erence between sub-national governmentsspending and their own tax revenues is
known as the vertical scal gap. The term vertical scal imbalance has had more ambiguous
denitions. In some studies, such as OECD (2007), vertical scal imbalance is synonymous
with a vertical scal gap while in others, such as Breton (1996), it is dene it as a mismatch
between a governments spending responsibilities and its access to tax revenues.1 In Australia
and Canada, there have been major political clashes between politicians representing the two
levels of government over whether a vertical scal imbalance exists or not, whether further
tax powers should be ceded to subnational governments, and whether transfers subnational
governments should be increased. These debates have been made more contentious because
of the lack of a meaningful denition of vertical scal balanceor any agreement on what
constitutes an optimal vertical scal gap.
In this paper, we adopt the a denition of "scal balance" in a federation that is based
on the e¢ ciency of resource allocation between the central and subnational governments. In
particular we will dene a vertical scal balance as occuring in a federation when the ratio
of the marginal benet of the public services provided by the subnational governments and
by the central government is equal to their relative marginal cost of production. Dened
in this way, a vertical scal balance implies that the residents of a subnational government
are indi¤erent between having one more dollar spent public services provided by the central
government and one less dollar spent on public services provided by subnational governments
or vice versa. When voters detemine the size of intergovernmental grants through elected
representatives in a federal legislature, equalizing the ratio of the marginal benets from
spending on central and subnational public services requires that the tax prices of public
services are equalized between the two orders of government. In most federations, the sub-
national governmentstax bases are narrower, or more tax sensitive, than the tax bases the
central government and as a consequence, they often have a high marginal cost of public
funds (MCFs). Lump-sum transfers from the central govenment are therefore required to
1See Sharma (2012) for an extensive review of the literature on the vertical scal gap and vertical scal
imbalance concepts.
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equalize or at least reduce the di¤erential in the MCFs of the two levels of government. The
"optimal" vertical scal gap will be the level of transfers that eliminates the vertical scal
imbalance between the two levels of government.
Our approach to the analysis of scal imbalances and the optimal vertical scal gaps is
most closely related to the papers of Boadway and Tremblay(2006, 2010). However, unlike
their models, we have adopted a framework in which there are no vertical or horizontal scal
externalities between and across governments. Therefore, in our model, the motivation for
providing intergovernmental grants is to address vertical scal imbalances in the federation.
Another important di¤erence is that we adopt a political economy approach to try to explain
how majority voting can give rise to a system of transfers. Thus the focus of our model is
more predictive and less normative than the Boadway and Tremblay contributions.2
In Section 2 we outline the basic structure of the model. We adopt the simplifying as-
sumption that the federal transfer is restricted to an equal per capita grant to all provinces.
While this assumption is clearly very restrictive and does not accurately reect the system
of grants in most federations, it helps to clarify the structure of the model and the key forces
that drive the main results. In Section 3, we relax the assumption of equal per capita
grants by assuming that the federation uses a scal equalization formula to make transfers
to subnational governments with below average scal capacities as well as equal per capita
transfers. In these broad features, the model has similarities with the Canadian intergovern-
mental grant system which combines scal equalization grants with other lump-sum grants.
In Section 4, we extend the model to the case where the choice of the equalization formula
is determined by voting in the federal legislature and we derive predictions concerning the
characteristics of that formula. In Section 5, we provide some preliminary tests of the pre-
dictions of the model based on time series data from Canada and cross-section data from nine
federations. We nd that a key prediction of the political economiy modelthat transfers
should be negatively related to the average income in a "pivotal province"are rejected for
the Canadian time series data, but the key predict is consistent with the allocation of inter-
governmental grants within the federations in the cross-section data. Furthermore, we nd
2For other political economy models on the level and pattern of intergovernmental transfers, see Pereira
(1996), Dixit and Londregan (1998), Crémer and Palfrey (2000), Snoddon and Wen (2003), and Volden
(2007).
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that there are substantial di¤erences in the allocation of intergovernmental grants in pres-
idential and parliamentary systems of government. The nal section of the paper contains
some concluding remarks.
2 A Model of Vertical Fiscal Imbalances with Equal
Per Capita Grants
We begin by considering a simple model of a federation with two levels of government. At the
federal level, elections are based on a nation-wide vote. The federal legislature is unicameral
and based on representation by population. There are n subnational governments, which
we will call provincial governments, and the election of a unicameral provincial legislature is
based on majority voting within each province. In the provincial elections, voters take the
federal expenditure on the federal public good, the federal tax rate, and transfers to their
province as given.
The utility function of individual h in province i is:
Uhi =  lnG+  ln gi +  lnXhi + b lnZhi (1)
where 0 < ; 0 < ; 0 <  < 1; 0 < b < 1; and b+  = 1: G is the expenditure on the public
good or service provided by the federal government. It is uniform across the country. The
per capita expenditure on the public service provided by province i is gi. Xhi and Zhi are
the private goods consumed by individual h in province i. The producer prices of all four
goods are equal constant and equal to one. The federal government nances its expenditures
by imposing a nation-wide per unit tax of tf on X; and therefore the consumer price of X is
1+ tf in all provinces. Similarly, province i imposes a per unit tax of ti on the consumption
of Z; and its consumer price in province i is 1 + ti. Individual h has a xed income Yh, and
his demand functions for the two private goods are:
Xhi = 
Yh
1 + tf
(2)
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Zhi = b
Yh
1 + ti
(3)
It is assumed that all individuals in all provinces have the same preferences for provincial
and federal public services and for the private goods. Individuals incomes vary within
each province and between provinces. The average income in province i is Yai. Let si be
the population of province i with the national population normalized to equal one. The
population shares of the provinces are xed, i.e. there is no inter-provincial migration due
to di¤erences in scal variables. The national average income is Yave =
P
siYai:
There are no vertical or horizontal scal externalities in this model. The federal govern-
ments tax base, X, is not a¤ected by ti or gi and the provincial tax base Zi is not a¤ected
by tf or G. Similarly, there are no spillovers of benets across provincial boundaries from
the provision of the provincial public service and province is tax base is not a¤ected by the
tax rates imposed in other provinces.
For future reference, we will dene vertical scal balance in the provision of public services
as occurring when the marginal rate of substitution between federal and provincial public
services equals their marginal rate of transformation. With the utility function in (1),
vertical scal balance implies that gi=G = =: If gi=G < =, there is a vertical scal
imbalance in the sense that the residents of province i would be better o¤with a small increase
in spending on the provincial public service and a corresponding reduction in spending on
the federal public service. In this case, the residents of province i will perceive a federal
imbalance in spending Conversely, if gi=G > =, the residents of province i would be
better o¤with a small increase in spending on the federal public service and a corresponding
reduction in spending on the provincial public service. We will refer to this case as a
provincial imbalance in spending.
In order to illustrate the properties of the model, we begin by assuming that the federal
government provides an equal per capita transfer to all provincial governments. Our ob-
jective is to illustrate how the level of this transfer, T , would be determined along with the
other federal and provincial scal variables, G, tf ; gi, and ti. Since voters in the provincial
elections are assumed to take the T , G, and tf as given when they make their voting deci-
sions, we analyze the provincial scal decisions rst. Then we turn to the determination of
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the federal scal variables.
2.1 Provincial Fiscal Decisions
Each provincial government nances its expenditures from its tax on Z and its transfer from
the federal government. Province is budget constraint, expressed in per capita terms, is:
gi =
ti
1 + ti
bYai + T (4)
where T is the per capita federal lump-sum grant which is the same for all provinces. In
most of our discussion, it will be assumed that transfers ow from the federal government
to the provinces, i.e. T  0. However, we also consider the possibility, later in this section,
that transfers could ow from the provinces to the central government.
In making his decision about the preferred level of provincial services and the provincial
tax rate that is needed to nance it, each individual takes the federal transfer, federal public
services, and the federal tax rate as given. The optimal gi and ti for individual h in province
i are can be found by substituting gi from equation (4) and Zhi from (3) into (1) and
maximizing the resulting utility function with respect to ti.
gi =

+ b
(bYai + T ) (5)
ti =
Yai   T
bYai + T
(6)
Note that the provincial scal variables that are preferred by individual h do not depend on
his own income, but are determined by the average income in his province. This implies
that all individuals in the province desire the same scal package, given by (5) and (6). This
unanimity concerning the desired provincial scal variables arises because of the assumption
that all individuals have the Cobb-Douglas utility function (1). The intuition underlying
this result is explained below.
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The marginal benet that an individual derives from the provincial public service is:
MBhgi =
1
h
@U
@gi
=
Yh
gi
(7)
where h = Y  1h is the individuals marginal utility of income. The individuals tax price
for the provincial service, Phi, is the cost to the individual of an additional dollar spent on
the provincial public service and is equal to:
Phi =   1
h
@Uh
@ti
@Ri
@ti
(8)
where Ri = tiZai =

ti
1+ti

bYai is the provinces per capita tax revenue and Zai is the average
consumption of the commodity taxed by the province. From Roys theorem,
@Uh
@ti
=  hZhi,
the above equation can also be expressed as:
Phi =
Zhi
Zai + ti
@Zai
@ti
=

Zhi
Zai
"
1
1 + ti
@ lnZai
@ti
#
(9)
The expression in square brackets can be interpreted as the marginal cost of public funds
for the provincial government, MCFi, and therefore:
Phi =

Yhi
Yai

MCFi (10)
Note that given the demand function for Zai, MCFi = (1 + ti) = (1   i) 1 where i =
(ti=(1 + ti)) is the equivalent ad valorem tax rate. This implies that the provinces MCFi
is increasing in its tax rate. It also implies that if the provincial governments have a
"narrower" tax base because b is lower, or a smaller tax base because Yai is lower, a province
will need to impose a higher tax rate to collect a given amount of revenue, and it will have a
higher MCFi. For future reference, the federal governments marginal cost of public funds
is MCFf = 1+ tf = (1  f ) 1 where f = (tf=(1 + tf )) is the equivalent federal ad valorem
tax rate.
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The tax price of provincial public services is the product of two factors a redistributive
factor (Yhi=Yai) and a tax distortion factor, the MCFi. The redistributive factor arises
because, in the absence of tax distortions, the increase in per capita revenues from a tax
rate increase is proportional to the average income in the province while the increase in an
individuals tax burden is in proportion to his income. The redistributive e¤ect can make
the e¤ective tax price of a dollar of provincial spending less than a dollar for an individual
whose income is less than the average income. The tax distortion e¤ect implies that the tax
price for public services can exceed a dollar because the tax base shrinks when the tax rate
is increased.
At the individuals preferred level of service, MBhgi equals his Phi. Note from (7) and
(10), both the marginal benet and the tax price increase in proportion to the individuals
income and therefore all individuals in a given province will agree on the optimal level of
provincial public service. This situation is illustrated in Figure 1 where Y2i > Y1i and P2i >
P1i, but both individuals prefer goi because MB2gi exceeds MB1gi by exactly the amount
necessary to compensate for the higher tax price faced by individual 2. While unanimity
with respect to the desired provincial scal policy is clearly unrealistic, this implication
of the Cobb-Douglas utility function greatly simplies our analysis of voting in multi-level
elections and allows us to focus on inter-provincial di¤erences in the desired scal policies of
the federal and provincial governments.
Note that this model exhibits the ypaper e¤ect, i.e. the increase in provincial govern-
ment spending from an increase in the federal transfer is larger than an equivalent increase
in its average per capita income since:
dgi
dT
=

+ b
>
dgi
dYai
=
b
+ b
(11)
The ypaper e¤ect will be greater when the provincial governmentstax base is narrower,
i.e. b is lower, and its MCFi is larger.3 Furthermore, note that the increase in spending on
the provincial public service is less than the the increase in transfers. Therefore an increase
in the federal transfer will lead to a reduction in the provincial tax rate and an increase in
3See Hamilton (1986), Becker and Mulligan (2003), Volden (2007) and Dahlby (2011) on the ypaper
e¤ect arising from subnational governmentsuse of distortionary taxation to nance their expenditures.
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consumption of the commodity taxed by the provincial governments.
2.2 Federal Fiscal Decisions
We will now consider the scal decisions made at the federal level based on a national election
to a unicameral legislature. The federal governments per capita budget constraint is:
G+ T =
tf
1 + tf
Yave  Rf (12)
where Yave is the national average income. It is assumed that voting on the federal govern-
ments scal variables occurs in two stages.4 First, there is a vote on the size of the federal
governments budget, Rf , or equivalently a vote on the federal tax rate. In the second stage,
there is vote on the allocation of the budget between G and T . Since the decision in the
rst stage of voting will depend on the outcomes of the voting in the second stage, we begin
by analyzing the second stage voting in which the size of the federal budget, Rf , is xed.
2.2.1 Second Stage Voting: The Allocation of the Federal Budget Between G
and T
Given the scal decisions that will be made at the provincial level based on the federal
transfer, the utility function of individual h in province i can now be written as:
Uhi =  lnG+  ln


+ b
(bYai + T )

+  lnXhi + b ln

Yhi
Yai

b
+ b

(bYai + T )

(13)
where (5) has been used to substitute to gi and (6) has been substituted for ti in the demand
function for Zhi. Maximizing (13) with respect to G and T , subject to the constraint that
Rf = G+T , yields the following expressions for the optimal G and T for an individual with
income Yh residing in province i:
G =

+ + b
(Rf + bYai) (14)
4See Casamatta et al. (2000) and Cremer et al. (2007) for public choice models of social security systems
where voting on the parameters of the systems occurs in two stages.
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T =
(+ b)Rf   bYai
+ + b
(15)
Again, the optimal G and T for an individual residing in province i do not depend on his
income, but instead they depend on the average income in the province. Consequently, all
individuals in province i would favour the same allocation of the federal budget between G
and T . If the optimal T in (15) is substituted in (5), then the ratio gi=G based on (14)
is =. In other words, for the residents of each province, the optimal allocation of the
federal budget between G and T would allow them to achieve a vertical scal balance in the
provision of provincial and federal services.
Which scal package will be successful in voting in the federal legislature? First, note that
all of the representatives in the federal legislature from province i prefer the level of federal
services and the transfer to the provinces given by (14) and (15) and that the preferred
G is increasing in the provinces average income and the preferred T is decreasing in the
provinces average income. Suppose the provinces can be ordered according to their average
income such that Ya1  Ya2  :::  Yan: We will dene the pivotal province as province p
such that less than 50 percent of the population live in provinces with average incomes less
than Yap and less than 50 percent of the population live in provinces with average incomes
greater than Yap. More formally, the pivotal province p is dened by the conditions:
p 1X
i=1
si < 0:5 and
nX
i=p+1
si < 0:5 (16)
With majority voting in the federal legislature, the dominant scal package will be the one
preferred by the representatives from the pivotal province. An alternative scal package
that contained a higher level of G and a lower T than the one preferred by the pivotal
province would be defeated by a majority of representatives from the provinces 1 to p: Any
alternative scal package that contained a lower level of G and a higher T than the one
preferred by province p would be defeated by a majority of representatives from provinces p
to n. Consequently, in our model the allocation of the federal budget will be based on (14)
and (15) with Yai = Yap.
This implies that there will be a vertical scal balance for the residents of the pivotal
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province, i.e. gp=G = =. However, the residents of the other provinces will perceive a
vertical scal imbalance, since G is the same in all provinces while gi varies from province
to province. Since gi increases with Yai, the model predicts that the residents of provinces
with average incomes below Yap will complain that there is too little provincial spending
on public services, compared to federal spending, whereas the residents of provinces with
average incomes greater than Yap would prefer an expansion of federal services at the expense
to provincial services. More formally, it can be shown that:
gi
G
=



(+ b)Rf + b (+ b)Yai + b (Yai   Yap)
(+ b)Rf + b (+ b)Yap

gi
G
? 

as Yai ? Yap (17)
An index of the vertical scal imbalance in province i is derived below.
2.2.2 First Stage Voting: The Size of the Federal Budget Rf
The optimal Rf , from the perspective of individual h in province i is determined by the
following rst-order condition:
dUhi
dRf
=

G
dG
dRf
+

gi
dgi
dRf
+

Xhi
dXhi
dRf
+
b
Zhi
dZhi
dRf
= 0 (18)
where:
dG
dRf
=

+ + b
; and
dgi
dRf
=

+ + b
; (19)
dXhi
dRf
=   Yhi
Yave
; and
dZhi
dRf
=
b
+ + b
Yhi
Yai
As indicated above, an increase in the federal budget increases spending on the provincial
public service, gi, as well as the federal public service, G, because a one dollar increase in the
federal budget increases the per capita transfer to the provinces by (+b)=(++b) dollars.
A larger federal budget implies a higher federal tax rate, which reduces consumption of the
private good, X, but increases consumption of the private good, Z, because the increase in
transfers to the provinces results in a reduction in the provincial tax rate, ti, as indicated in
(6).
11
Substituting the derivatives in (19) into (18), the condition for the optimal Rf for an
individual with income Yh residing in province i can be written in the following intuitive
form:
Phf =


+ + b

MBhG +


+ + b

MBhgi +

b
+ + b

Phi (20)
where Phf = (Yh=Yave)MCFf is the individuals tax price for an additional dollar of spending
by the federal government. For individual h, the optimal federal budget balances the tax
price he has to pay for an additional dollar of spending by the federal government with his
marginal benet from additional dollar spent federal government on federal public services
and transfers to the provinces, which is given by the terms on the right-hand side of (20). The
additional benet from federal spending is made up of the marginal benet from the federal
public service, MBhG, the marginal benet from additional provincial services, MBhgi, and
the marginal benet from consumption of the good taxed by the provincial government, Zhi,
where this is measured by the individals tax price for provincial services, Phi. The factors
in brackets indicate how an additional dollar spent by the federal government is allocated
between spending on the federal public service and transfers which result in more provincial
public services and provincial tax cuts.
For purposes of analysis, it will be more convenient to write the optimality condition in
(20)as the following:
2
gi
+
2
G
=
 (+ + b)
Xhi
Yhi
Yave
  b
2
Zhi
Yhi
Yai
(21)
Note that the left-hand side of (21) does not depend on Yhi because from (5) gi is independent
of Yhi, and from (14) G is independent of Yhi. Since the left-hand side of (21) is independent
of Yhi, the right-hand side will also be independent of Yhi. Therefore the optimal Rf for an
individual in province i depends on the average income in the province, and we will evaluate
the right-hand side of (21) at the Yhi = Yai. In the Appendix, we show that dRf=dYai < 0.
Since the desired federal budget declines as the provinces average income increases, by the
same argument that was employed in the previous section, a majority of the representatives
in the federal legislature will support the Rf that is preferred by the residents of the pivotal
province.
As noted above, the residents of the pivotal province are able to achieve a vertical scal
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balance in expenditures on the federal and provincial public services. Therefore, with the
equilibrium Rf the residents of pivotal province equalize the tax price of federal spending
with the tax price of provincial spending. This result is fairly intuitive. The residents of the
pivotal province e¤ectively control the federal tax rate as well as their provinces tax rate,
and it is not in their interest to buy federal public services at a lower or higher tax price
than the tax price they pay for provincial public services. It is in their interest to equate
the tax prices that they pay for public services from the two levels of government through
their choice of Rf and T .
Given that the equality of the tax prices of federal and provincial public services in the
pivotal province, the size of the federal budget is will be:
Rf =
 (+ + b)Yave   bYap
+ + b+ 
(22)
which implies that federal tax revenue as a proportional of average national income level,
Rf=Yave, will be decreasing in the ratio of the average income in the pivotal province to
average national income, Yap=Yave.
The equilibrium transfer to the provinces is equal to:
T =
(+ b)Yave   b(+ )Yap
+ + b+ 
(23)
The transfer will increase with average national income and decrease with the average income
of the pivotal province, and it will be positive if and only if:
(1 + =b)
(1 + =)
>
Yap
Yave
(24)
In other words, transfers will ow in the "normal" direction, i.e. from the federal government
to the provinces, if individuals place a relatively high value on the provincial public service
compared to the size of the provincial tax base, and a relatively low value of federal public
services compared to the size of the federal tax base, and the average income in the pivotal
province is low compared to the average national income. Note that transfers to the provinces
can occur even if the pivotal provinces average income exceeds the national average if =b >
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=. In other words, it is possible for an above averge income province to desire a positive
level of transfers from the federal government, even though an additional dollar of federal
transfers "costs" its average taxpayer more than a dollar, if the value that its residents place
on provincial public services, relative to the size of the provincial tax base, exceeds the ratio
of the value of federal public services to the size of the federal tax base.
The equilibrium expenditures on the federal and provincial public services will be equal
to:
G =
(Yave + bYap)
+ + b+ 
(25)
gi =
b
+ b
Yai +

+ + b+ 
Yave   b(+ )
(+ b)(+ + b+ )
Yap (26)
where:
gp =
(Yave + bYap)
+ + b+ 
(27)
Again, note that gp=G = = and the residents of the pivotal province will achieve a scal
balance in expenditures on provincial and federal services.
We will measure the size of the vertical scal gap as the proportion of provincial spending
that is nanced by the transfer from the federal government:
V FG =
TPn
i=1 sigi
=
+ b

(+ b)Yave   b(+ )Yap
[b(+ +  + b) + (+ b)]Yave   b(+ )Yap (28)
This expression is quite complex, but it can be shown that the V FG is decreasing the ratio
Yap=Yave. Note also that if b = 0, then V FG = 1. In other words, if the provinces do not
have access to a tax base, the federal government nances all provincial spending. Thus
we expect the V FG to be higher in federations where the provinces have narrower or more
restrictive tax bases. The formula for the V FG is greatly simplied when Yap = Yave; in
which case (28) becomes:
V FG =

b+ 
 




b
b+ 
(29)
In other words, when the average income of the pivotal province is equal to the national
average income and the residents of the pivotal province do not have a redistributive motive
for receiving a transfer from the federal government, the vertical scal gap will be equal to
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the federal governments share of the tax base minus the provinces share of the tax base
weighted by the relative valuation of federal and provincial public services.
The model also allows us the dene a measure of vertical scal imbalance for the residents
of province i as:
V FIi  gi=G
=
=
bYai + Yave +
b(+ )
+ b
(Yai   Yap)
Yave + bYap
(30)
where V FIi 7 1 as Yai 7 Yap. The residents of provinces with average incomes below Yap
will desire more provincial services relative to federal services and argue that the federal
government should provide higher transfers to the provinces. Conversely, the residents of
provinces with average incomes in excess Yap would prefer a reduction in federal transfers
and a corresponding increase in spending on the federal public service. One implication of
this model is that vertical scal imbalances are an inevitable feature of a federation if there
are di¤erences in the scal capacities of the provinces, which in this model is reected in
di¤erences in average incomes across provinces.
2.2.3 Comparative Static Results
Let yp equal Yap=Yave. The following predictions can be derived from the model outline
above:
d(G=Yave)
dyp
> 0 (31)
i.e. the ratio of spending on federal public services to the national average income should be
increasing in the ratio of the pivotal provinces income to the national average income.
d(T=G)
dyp
< 0 (32)
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i.e. the ratio of federal transfers to spending on federal public services should be decreasing
in the ratio of the pivotal provinces income to the national average income.
d(T=Yave)
dyp
< 0 (33)
i.e. ratio of federal transfers to national average income should be decreasing in the ratio of
the pivotal provinces income to the national average income.
d(gave=Yave)
dyp
< 0 (34)
i.e. the ratio of spending on provincial public services to the national average income should
be decreasing in the ratio of the pivotal provinces income to the national average income.
d(T=gave)
dyp
=
dV FG
dyp
< 0 (35)
i.e. the vertical scal gap should be decreasing in the ratio of the pivotal provinces income
to the national average income.
3 Transfers Under a Representative Tax System Form
of Fiscal Equalization
A major limitation of the preceding model is the assumption that every province receives the
same per capita lump-sum grant from the federal government. Most, but not all, federations
have a system of scal equalization grants which increases the scal resources of provinces
with low "scal capacity". By their nature, these transfers vary across the provinces.
Examples of countries with these types of transfers are Australia, Canada, and Germany.
Since scal equalization is an important component of the intergovernmental transfer systems
of these and other countries, we investigate the implications of a scal equalization system
for scal imbalances in the context of the political economy model outlined in the previous
section.
16
In this section, we consider the pattern of transfers that would arise under the Represen-
tative Tax System (RTS) approach to scal equalization because it is often viewed as the
"Gold Standard" for scal equalization systems. Under the RTS, a province with a below
average scal capacity receives a per capita grant such that if it imposes the average tax rate
on its tax base it will have the same per capita revenues as a province with the average per
capita tax base that imposes the average tax rate. We will consider the "net equalization"
version of an RTS system. Provinces with above average scal capacity contribute to the
pool of revenue that is used to nance the transfers to the provinces with low scal capacity.
The federal government does not contribute to the nancing of the grants. In the RTS
equalization framework, the scal capacity of a province is meaured by its per capita tax
base and the transfer recieved by province i (or the contribution by province i) is equal to:
Ti = tave [Zave   Zai] (36)
where tave is the national average tax rate, Zave is the national average per capita tax base
for the pronvinces, and Zai is the average per capita tax base in province i. A province is
either a net contributor or a net recipient of the transfers as its per capita base is greater
than or less than the national average. Since tave = Rave=Zave where Rave is the average per
capita own-source tax revenues of the provinces, the equalization tranfer for province i can
also be written as:
Ti = Rave

1  Zai
Zave

(37)
The quantum of equalization varies with the total revenues of all of the provinces and their
relative disparities. This transfer system allows recipient provinces to increase spending on
local public services and to reduce their tax rates, while provinces with above average per
capita tax bases will have to raise their tax rates or cut their expenditures to nance their
contributions to the transfers to the other provinces. We will assume that voters treat the
RTS transfers as lump-sum grants. This is not an innocuous assumption because Smart
(1998) and others have shown that this type of equalization system creates an incentive for
provinces to increase tax rates because a provinces transfer will increase (or its contribution
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will decline) when a higher tax rate erodes its tax bases through tax avoidance and evasion.5
Based on equations (3) and (6), the components of the RTS equalization formula are:
Rave =
b
+ b
Yave (38)
Zai =
b2Yai + bTi
+ b
(39)
Zave =
b2Yave
+ b
(40)
since the average per capita transfer is zero. Substituting the above into the RTS, a provinces
transfer will be equal to:
Ti =
b
b+ 2
(Yave   Yai) (41)
Note that the marginal transfer rate,  = b=(b + 2), is a constant and less than one.
The RTS transfer only lls part of the gap between a provinces average income and the
national average income. The marginal transfer rate is increasing in b, the relative size
of the provincestax base and with ; the strength of preference for the provincial public
service.
Substituting Ti into (5), where it is understood that this is a province-specic grant,
the level of the provincial public good provided by province i is:
gi =
b
2+ b


+ b
Yave + Yai

(42)
Thus the level of the public service in a province depends on both the national average
income and the provinces average income. Public service levels are higher in provinces
with higher average incomes, but the range of provision of provincial service shrinks, with a
higher level of service provided in the below average income provinces and a reduction the
provision of provincial public services in the above average income provinces, compared to
the no transfer case.
5The model becomes analytically intractable when this type of scal behaviour is incorporated in the
model. In the future we may try to simulate the system of grants that would emerge with this type of
response.
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With the RTS system, federal taxes are only used to nance federal public services, and
the level of federal services will satisfy the following condition:
G =

+ 
Yave (43)
Combining (42) and (43), we obtain the following expression for the relative provision of
provincial and federal services:
gi
G
=



b (+ )
 (b+ 2) (+ b)
+
b (+ )
 (b+ 2)
Yai
Yave

(44)
There will be a scal imbalance in province i, with provincial (federal) imbalance in spending
if the expression in square brackets is greater than (less than) one or:
gi
G
R 

as
Yai
Ya
R (1  b) (b+ 2)
b (1 +   b)  

+ b
(45)
where we make use of the restriction that  = 1   b. Thus the conditions under which the
residents of a province might perceive an inadequate provision of provincial services under
an RTS grant system is quite complex. One relatively simple case occurs when  =  and
b =  = 0:5. In this case, gi=G R = as Yai R Yave. That is, the residents of provinces
with below average incomes will perceive a federal imbalance in spending while the residents
in provinces with above average incomes will perceive a provincial imbalance in spending.
Note also that when the provinces have a very narrow tax base and b is very small, even
the residents of very high income provinces will perceive a federal imbalance in spending
because their provinces tax rate will be relatively high in order to nance the transfers
to the recipient provinces. Similarly, if  becomes very large relative to , residents of
high income provinces will perceive a federal imbalance in spending. Thus an RTS scal
equalization system will not eliminate vertical scal imbalances in a federation, and it entirely
possible that the residents of all provinces will perceive a federal imbalance in spending.
Given that an RTS scal equalization grants could lead to a wide-spread perception of
federal scal imbalance, the majority of voters may desire per capita transfers from the
federal government. In this section, we extend the model by combining voting on an equal
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per capita transfer with the existence of an RTS scal equalization system. Here we will
assume that the RTS transfers are mandated by the constitution and therefore the federal
legislature only determines an equal per capita transfer that is nanced out of federal tax
revenues. (In the next section, we consider a model where the federal legislature determines
the equalization formula.) Consequently the per capita transfer received by province i will
be equal to:
Ti =  (Yave   Yai) + T (46)
where  is the marginal transfer rate under the RTS transfer system and T is the equal per
capita. The determination of the key scal variables is determined in the same manner as
in Section 2 and therefore we simply note that at the provincial level we will have:
ti =
(+ )Yai   Yave   T
(b  )Yai + Yave + T (47)
gi =
 (T + Yave + (b  )Yai)
+ b
(48)
At the federal level, the choice of G and T , given total federal revenues, Rf , will be
determined by the pivotal province and will be equal to:
G =

+ + b
[Rf + Yave + (b  )Yap] (49)
T =
1
+ + b
[(+ b)Rf   Yave    (b  )Yap] (50)
The voters of the pivotal province will determine Rf based on equation (18) to equalize
the tax price of federal services and the tax price of provincial services, such that:
Rf =

+ +  + b
[(+ + b  )Yave   (b  )Yap] (51)
With this level federal transfers and services, the residents of the pivotal province will achieve
a scal balance with gp=G = =. As before, provinces with an average income below that of
the pivotal province will perceive a federal scal imbalance and those provinces with average
incomes above the pivotal province will perceive a provincial scal imbalance.
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Substituting (51) into (50), the total per capita transfer to province i is:
Ti =
( + ) (+ b)Yave   ( + ) (b  )Yap
+ +  + b
  Yai (52)
The total per capita transfer received by province i will be increasing in the national average
income, decreasing with the average income of the pivotal province, and decreasing with the
average income of province i. With this combination of per capita and RTS equalization
grants, even province n with the highest average income can a net recipient of a grant if:
Yan
Yave
<
( + ) (+ b)

  ( + ) (b  )

Yap
Yave
(53)
If this condition holds, the scal equalization grant is e¤ectively nanced by the federal gov-
ernment even though provincial governments with above average incomes nominally nance
the equalization transfer. For example, if Yap = Yave, b = 0:4,  = 0:6,  = 0:6,  = 0:4,
and  = 0:15, the highest income province will be a net transfer recipient if Yan=Yave < 3:33.
Since regional disparities are rarely this large, the model suggests that we could observe
federally-nanced transfer systems that have the characteristics of a net equalization RTS
combined with an equal per capita grant.
Finally, in the Section 5.2 we test the predictions of the model using data on the relative
transfer received by province i, Ti=T . It can be shown that the relative transfer received by
province i is:
Ti
T
=
 (+ +  + b)

Yai
Yave

+ (+ ) (b  )

Yap
Yave

  (+ b) ( + )
 (+ )   (+ b) + (b  ) (+ )

Yap
Yave
 (54)
From the above equation, we can derive the prediction that a province is relative transfer
will decrease as its relative income increases and increase (decrease) as the pivotal provinces
relative income increases if province is average income is below (above) the national average
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income. The is:
d

Ti
T

d

Yai
Yave
 < 0 (55)
d

Ti
T

d

Yap
Yave
 = a1  Yai
Yave

(56)
where a is a positive coe¢ cient. Therefore in the regression model in Section 5.2, we include
the e¤ect of the two relative income variables on Ti=T as a

1  Yai
Yave

Yap
Yave

.
4 A Political Economy Model of Fiscal Equalization
In the preceding section, the RTS equalization system was exogenous to the model. In
this section, we consider the determination of the scal equalization formula by a federal
government. As in the previous models, we assume that voters at the provincial level take
the federal tax rate and the per capita transfer to their province, Ti, as given when they
vote to determine gi and ti. As before, equations (5) and (6) indicate the provision of the
provincial public good and the provincial tax rate.
Individuals in each province will have a preferred scal equalization formula. To put
some structure on these choices, we assume that the equalization formula has to have the
following general form:
Ti = s [Ys   Yai] and Ti = 0 for Yai  Ys (57)
That is, province is per capita transfer will be determined by the deviation of its average per
capita income from a standard income level, Ys, and a parameter, s, which will determine
the quantum of the grant. We assume that choices are restricted to a "gross equalization"
formula such as the one that has been used in Canada for 50 years. The equalization grants
are nanced out of the federal governments general revenues, and the provinces with average
incomes above the standard do not fund the transfers.
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As before, the residents of each province will be unanimous in their preferred values for
s and Ys. Consider the residents of province i with average income Yai. The equalization
standard that will maximize their per capita grant is Ys = Yai+1 because they will not have
to share the transfer with any of the higher income provinces. Only provinces with incomes
from Ya1 to Yai will receive grants. The average per capita grant with this standard will be:
T =
iX
j=1
sjTj = s
iX
j=1
sj [Yai+1   Yaj] = swi
h
Yai+1   Y^ai
i
(58)
where wi =
iP
j=1
sj is the population of the recipient provinces and Y^ai is the average income
in the recipient provinces. Consequently, the per capita transfer that province i will receive,
for a given T , is:
Ti =
1
wi
(Yai+1   Yi)
Yai   Y^ai
T = i T (59)
This is the equalization grant formula that would be preferred by province i, given that the
formula has to satisfy the general restriction in (54). Note also that it will be assumed that
i > 1. There is an average income level Yac = hcY^ac+(1 hc)Yac+1 where c = 1: Provinces
with average income above Yac will prefer an equal per capita grant.
While each province has a preferred equalization formula of this form, the formula that
is preferred by the pivotal province will garner a majority of votes in the federal legislature
in any competition against an alternative equalization formula. Therefore the equalization
formula that is adopted by the federal government will have the form Ti = iT where:
i =
1
wp
(Yap+1   Yai)
Yap+1   Y^ap
 (60)
With this parameter in equalization formula, the provinces with a lower income will receive
a higher transfer relative to the average per capita transfer and that province with income
in excess of the pivotal province will not receive equalization grants.
Next we consider voting in the federal legislature to determine T and G for a given size
of the federal budget, Rf . Again, maximizing the utility function in (13) subject to the
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constraint Rf = G+ T , yields the preferred values for G and T for each province given Rf .
Again the levels of these scal variables that will receive majority support in the federal
legislature are those that are desired by the pivotal province and they will be equal to:
G =

+ + b

Rf +
b
p
Yap

(61)
T =
1
+ + b

(+ b)Rf    b
p
Yap

(62)
The determination of the size of the federal budget satises the condition in (18) but
now in (19) we have dgi=dRf = (i)=(+  + b). As a result, the rst order condition for
the optimal Rf from the perspective of the residents of province i will satisfy this modied
version of (21):
i
2
gi
+
2
G
=
 (+ + b)
Xhi
Yhi
Yave
  b
2
Zhi
Yhi
Yai
(63)
As before, all households in province i will agree on their preferred Rf , and it will be
decreasing in the provinces average income. The privotal provinces preferred Rf will
receive majority support in the legislature and it will be equal to:
Rf =
 (+ + b)Yave   b 1p Yap
+ + b+ 
(64)
Note that since p > 1, the federal revenue and therefore federal taxes will be higher under
the equalization program than they would be if the federal transfer was restricted to an equal
per capita transfer. The larger federal revenues and federal transfers occur because now the
pivotal province will get more than equal per capita grant. The key scal variables will be:
T =
(+ b)Yave   b(+ ) 1p Yap
+ + b+ 
(65)
gp =
 (bYap + pYave)
+ + b+ 
(66)
G =
 (bYap + pYave)
p(+ + b+ )
(67)
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Dividing (63) by (64), we obtain:
gp
G
= p


(68)
This indicates that with their preferred scal variables, the residents of the pivotal province
will prefer to have a provincial scal imbalance. The pivotal province now gets more
benet from a dollar of federal revenue spent on transfers than it does on federal services.
Consequently, the residents of the province prefer higher per capita transfers and lower per
capita federal services compared to the situation described in Section 2 where transfers were
restricted to be equal per capita. The provision of the provincial public good in province i
where i  p will be equal to the following:
gi =
b
+ b
Yai +
i
+ + b+ 
Yave  

i
p

b(+ )
(+ b)(+ + b+ )
Yap (69)
Since gi is increasing in Yai, but it is also a¤ected by i, it is not clear whether other recipient
provinces will perceive a federal scal imbalance or not. Numerical simulation of the model
may shed some light on this aspect of the model.
5 Testing the Predictions of the Model
The political economy model in this paper was developed to provide insights concerning
perceptions of vertical scal imbalances in federations and to describe the determination of
intergovernmental grants when there are signicant di¤erences in the MCFs between the
provinces and the federal government. In this section, we preliminary tests of the pre-
dictions of the model based on time series data intergovernmental grants for Canada and
cross-section data on intergovernmental grants for nine federations developed by Dragu and
Rodden (2010).
5.1 Time Series Data for Canada
Without going into details, the Canadian federal-provincial transfer system combines a
system of equalization grants, where the equalization standard has varied over time and
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the equalization grants are nanced out of federal revenues, with lump-sum grants to the
provinces, now known as the Canada Health Transfer (CHT) and Canada Social Transfer
(CST).6 In the past the per capita transfers varied by province, but the CST has become
an equal per capita grant and the CHT is set to become an equal per capita grant in 2014.
Thus the grant system has elements of scal equalization and equal per capita lump-sum
transfers that might be best captured by the model in Section 3.
Figure 2 shows that these cash transfers to the provinces as a percentage of GDP has
declined from just over four percent of GDP in the mid 1980s to around 2.5 percent of GDP
from the mid-1990s to 2003. Subsequently, they have increased and are currently just over
three percent of GDP. The dramatic reduction in the federal transfers to the provinces
that occurred in the mid-1990s was the result of federal government adopting a stringent
scal restraint program to eliminate chronic federal budget decits. As part of its scal
restraint measures, the federal government reduced spending on its programs as well as the
non-equalization transfers to the provinces. The provincial governments became very vocal
in complaining about a federal scal imbalance during this period.
Given that an "exogenous" budgetary shock was the main determinant of the size of the
scal gap in the 1994-2003 period, the explanatory power of the political economy model
will be mainly tested by its ability to explain the trends in transfers pre-1994 and post-2003.
A key prediction of the models outlined in the previous sections was that the relative
average income of the "pivotal province" should be a key determinant of the transfers.
Therefore the rst step in testing the model is to indentify the "pivotal province" and to
calculate its average income relative to the national average. Although the model has
been formulated in terms of an income measure that might interpreted as personal income,
we have chosen to measure average income as GDP per capita because this is a better
approximation to the provincial tax bases in Canada which include corporate income tax
and royalty payments on natural resources which are owned by the provinces. Figure 3
indicates that the identity as well as the relative average income of the pivotal province in
Canada has varied over time. Ontario was the pivotal province in the early 1980s, but when
Ontario emerged from the recession, British Columbia (BC) became the pivotal province
6See Dahlby and Roberts (2010) for an overview of the system of intergovernmental grants in Canada.
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and remained pivotal until 2000, when Saskatchewan (Sask) become pivotal. Then in 2004
Ontario once again became pivotal.
Of course it is not the identity of the pivotal province, but its relative average income
that a¤ects the magnitude of federal transfers to the provinces. Figure 3 shows that the
relative average income of the pivotal province in Canada has varied over time, with an
upward trend from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, followed by a downward trend to 2000,
then a recovery to the national average, followed by a decline from the mid-2000s to the end
2009. While our measure of the relative average income of the pivotal province shows some
interesting variations over time, the range is relatively modest, from a peak of 1.065 in 1993
to a low of 0.917 in 2001. In most years, the pivotal provinces average income is close to
the national average. Note also that the period of federal scal restraint coincided with
the period when the relative income of the pivotal province was at its nadir and transfers
according to the model should have been a relatively high during this period. Thus an
exogenous event, federal scal restraint, may limit the explanatory power of the key variable
in the model. As Figure 4 indicates, there may in fact be a positive correlation between
federal transfers and the relative average income of the pivotal province.
Figure 5 shows the cross-sectional variation in federal transfers to individual provinces
and their relative per capita GDPs. A strong negative relationship emerges in all four years
that are shown in these gures with the notable exception of the observations for Alberta,
which is the data point on the extreme right in each of the gures. In other words, Alberta
has received more in transfers than would be warranted by its relative per capita GDP. This
suggests that the federal transfers to Alberta (and to other provinces) have been motivated
by more than concerns about correcting scal imbalances. For example, receipt of the
CHT obliges provincial governments to abide by the principles of the Canada Health Act in
organizing provincial heath care systems.
To perform a formal statistical test of the model, based on equation (52), we have re-
gressed the ratio of each provinces per capita transfer to the national average income against
the provinces relative average income, the relative average income of the pivotal province,
a dummy variable, FR, for the period of federal scal restraint fom 1995 to 2003, and a
dummy variable, AB, for Alberta. The data set consists of the 290 observation on the 10
27
provinces from 1981 to 2009. The regression equation is reported below:
Ti
Yave
= 0:116
(5:86)
  0:113
(26:48)
Yai
Yave
+ 0:0331
(1:73)
Yap
Yave
  0:00613FR
(3:82)
+ 0:0268AB
(8:69)
(70)
Adjusted R2 = 0:763. The t statistics are reported in parentheses. As expected, a provinces
relative average income is a major determinant of its per capita transfers. The coe¢ cient
estimate indicates that when a provinces per capita GDP increases by one dollar, holding the
national average GDP constant, transfers by 11.3 cents. The regression results conrm that
federal scal restaint lowered transfers. The coe¢ cient on the dummy variable for Alberta
is positive and statistically signicant. The pivotal provinces relative average income has
a positive coe¢ cient, contrary to the predictions of the model, but it is not statistically
signicant by a two tail test.
Further investigation of the statistical relationships is warranted, but our preliminary
results based on the time series data for Canada do not support the key prediction of the
model in Sections 2 and 3 that an increase in the relative income of the pivotal province
should be associated with a reduction in federal transfers.
Furthermore, the predictions of the model from Section 4 concerning the form or pattern
of scal equalization are not consistent with the Canadian experience. The model in Section
4 predicts that the pivotal province will always be a recipient of scal equalization grants.
Indeed it is predicted to be the highest income recipient province. However, the pivotal
province only received equalization grants in six of the 29 years in our data set. Thus the
model in Section 4 does not predict the equalization standard used to determine equalization
payments in Canada.
5.2 Cross-Section Data for Nine Federations: Preliminary Results
Rodden (2009) and Dragu and Rodden (2010) have shown that provinces that are over-
representated in the federal legislatures tend to receive higher per capita grants than other
provinces. Indeed in Argentina, Mexico, and the United States, provinces with higher per
capita GDPs receive higher per capita grants than poorer provinces. Rodden attributes
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this pattern of intergovernmental grants to the ability of legislators from over-representated
provinces to form coalitions with other legislators to extract higher grants from the federal
government. He notes that this tends to occur in presidential systems of government where
party discipline is weak. In this section of the paper, we test whether the models developed
in Sections 2 and 3 can explain the pattern of transfers in nine federations based on the
cross-section data from the Dragu and Rodden (2010) study, with particular attention to
the question of whether the model applies to presidential or parliamentary federations.
We begin by determining the pivotal province in each of the nine federations based on the
provincesshares of the representatives in the federal legislatures. As noted above, in many
federations provinces, such as the United States, small states are over-representated because
there is an upper house where representation is by province rather than by population. As
well, in some federations, such as Argentina, small states are over-represented in the lower
house. Thus to determine the pivotal province in each federation, we use data on the
proportion of federal legislators that come from the province rather than its share of the
population in each federation.
Table 1 shows the pivotal province in each of the nine federations, the pivotal provinces
relative income, the number of provinces in the federation, whether the federation has a
presidential or a parliamentary system, and the time period covered by the data. In most of
these federations the pivotal provincesper capita incomes are close to the national averages.
They are above the national average in Australia and Canada. Only in Switzerland is the
average income of the pivotal province, Basel-Landschaft, substantially below the national
average. The data set consists of observation on transfers to 209 provinces in the nine
federations based on average values of the variables over the time periods noted in Table 1.
Of the 209 observations, 51 are from federations with parliamentary systems of government
and 158 are from federations with presidential systems.
Table 2 shows the regression results where the dependent variable, Transfers, is the ratio
of the provinces per capita transfer to the average per capita transfer for all provinces
in the federation. In Model 1 we regress Transfers on Representation which is the ratio
of the number of legislative seats per capita in a province to the average number of seats
per province; Population Change which is the di¤erence between the relative population
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of a province in the rst year for which there are observations on grants and the relative
population of the province approximately 10 years after the rst observation; Province Size
which is the ratio of the area of the province to the average area of the provinces in the
federation; Capital Province which is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the
federal capital is located in the province; and Relative Incomes which is dened as (1  
Yai=Yave)(Yap=Yave). The predicted sign of the estimated coe¢ cient for Relative Incomes is
positive because an increase in province is relative income should reduce its relative transfer
to the extent that the federation adopts a system of equalization grants given by (46) and
an increase in the relative income of the pivotal province will increase (reduce) the relative
transfer of a province if it is below (above) the average national income. In Model 1, the
estimated coe¢ cients of the Representation variable and Capital Province are positive and
statistically signicant at the one percent level. The estimated coe¢ cients of Population
Change, Capital Province and Relative Incomes are positive but not statistically signicant.
As previously noted, the allocation of transfers among provinces may be quite di¤erent
under parliamentary and presidential systems of government because in a presidential system
the representatives of the provinces may have more scope for forming coalitions with other
provinces to capture more of the federal transfers. The model of the pattern of transfers
that was developed in Sections 2 and 3 is more consistent with a parliamentary setting,
where a particular political party can represent a set of regions with a common interest in
setting the transfers to redistribute income in their favour. Based on this conjecture, we
introduce a dummy variable, DP; which has a value of one if the country has a presiden-
tial system. We hypothesize that under a presidential system, the allocation of transfers is
largely determined by the Representation variable, whereas under a parliamentary system,
the Relative Incomes variable will determine the allocation of transfers. To capture the
di¤erential e¤ects of Representation and Relative Incomes under parliamentary and presi-
dential systems we multiply these variables by DP and add these two additional variables
in Model 2. With this regression model, Representation is positive and highly signicant
although the Representation*DP is not statistically signicant. However, the coe¢ cient of
Relative Incomes increases in magnitude and is statistically signicant at the ve percent
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level and the Relative Incomes interacted with the DP is negative and statistically signicant
at the 10 percent level. These results indicate that the Relative Incomes variable seems to
have the predicted e¤ects on the relative transfers in parliamentary systems but little or no
e¤ect on the distribution of transfers in presidential systems. Model 3 shows a simplied
version of Model 2 by dropping Province Size, Population Change, and Representation*DP
from the regression equation. The coe¢ cients of the remaining variables and their t statistics
are little changed from the results obtained in Model 2.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have developed a political economy model that determines the size of the
vertical scal gap and the vertical scal imbalances in the expenditures of the central govern-
ment and subnational governments. We have assumed that the system of transfers reects
the interests of voters located in di¤erent subnational governments across the country. We
eschew the assumption of identical regions because regional variations in key economic vari-
ables is one of the main reasons for federal forms of government exist. We have attempted to
dene the concept of scal balance, and its opposite, scal imbalance, in terms of the allo-
cation of spending at the two levels of government, rather than in terms of the conventional
denition of a di¤erence between own source revenues and expenditures at the subnational
level of government.
By making a strong assumption about the form of votersutility functions, we are able
to derive closed form expressions for the key scal variables in the model. The basic model
predicts that the residents in each province will vote for a combination of federal public
services and transfers to the provinces such that they can achieve a scal balance between
spending at the federal level and at the provincial level. In general, this means that they
would like to equalize the tax price of federal public services and provincial public services.
Since the federal government is assumed to provide the same level of public service across the
country, the residents of only one province can achieve a scal balance. A simple majority
voting model in the federal legislature predicts that this scal balance will be achieved by
the residents of the "pivotal province". The residents in provinces with lower average
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incomes will perceive a federal imbalance, and they would like to see higher transfers to fund
more provincial services and less spending on the federal public good. On the other hand,
provinces with above average incomes will see a provincial imbalance in spending. The
simple models outlined in Sections 2 and 3 indicate that a vertical scal imbalance cannot
be resolved through major voting in legislatures, but at least the imbalace will "balanced".
While the objective of the paper is provide insights into the potential for resolving scal
imbalance by democratically elected governments, the model can also be used to predict the
allocation of intergovernmental transfers in a federation. We have tested the key prediction
of the modelthat grants to reduce the vertical scal imbalance between the two levels of
government will be inversely related to the relative average income of the pivotal province
using time series data for Canada and cross-section data from nine federations. The key
prediction of the model is rejected with the time series data for Canada, but the main
prediction is veried for the federations with parliamentary forms of government based on
the cross-section data. The latter results then indicate that there are signicant di¤erences
in the pattern of transfers to subnational governments under presidential and parliamentary
systems. Further research may help to clarify and conrm the di¤erences in the pattern of
transfers to subnational governments with these two forms of government.
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7 Appendix
To determine how the desired federal budget varies with average province income, we can
write the left-hand side of (21) as (Rf ; Yai) and the right-hand side as (Rf ; Yai). Using
this notation and taking the total di¤erential, we can obtain the following comparative static
result:
dRf
dYai
=
Yai   Yai
f   f
(71)
It can be shown that:
Yai =
b4
Z2ai
1
+ + b
> 0 (72)
Yai =  

b
+ + b

3
g2i

< 0 (73)
Rf =  

1
+ + b

3
g2i
+
3
G2

< 0 (74)
Rf =
 (+ + b)
X2ai

Yai
Yave
2
+
b3
Z2ai

1
+ + b

> 0 (75)
and therefore:
dRf
dYai
< 0 (76)
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Table 1  Pivotal Provinces and Systems of Government for Nine Federations 
Country Pivotal 
Province 
Relative Income of 
the Pivotal Province 
Number 
of 
Provinces
System of 
Government 
Time 
Period 
Argentina La Rioja 0.887 24 Presidential 1983-1996 
Australia Victoria 1.029 8 Parliamentary 1990-2001 
Brazil Mato Grosso 0.904 27 Presidential 1986-2000 
Canada British 
Columbia 
1.199 10 Parliamentary 1968-1997 
Germany Berlin 0.959 16 Parliamentary 1995-2003 
Mexico Mexico 0.841 32 Presidential 1993-2006 
Spain Castile and 
León 
0.953 17 Parliamentary 1984-2001 
Switzerland Basel-
Landschaft 
0.519 26 Presidential 1998-2007 
United States Ohio 0.965 50 Presidential 1977-1997 
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Table 2 Regression Results From Cross-Section Data 
    
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
constant 0.259 0.278 0.324 
 (2.46) (2.48) (3.99) 
    
Representation 0.584 0.550 0.578 
 (20.27) (5.40) (20.29) 
    
Representation*DP  0.0302  
  (0.75)  
    
Population Change 0.101 0.104  
 (0.56) (0.59)  
    
Province Size 0.062 0.0515  
 (1.01) (0.84)  
    
Capital Province 1.18 1.258 1.22 
 (3.67) (3.87) (3.80) 
    
(1 - Yai/Yave)(Yap/Yave) 0.235 1.141 1.122 
 (1.60) (2.07) (2.07) 
    
(1 - Yai/Yave)(Yap/Yave)*DP  -0.965 -0.974 
  (1.70) (1.75) 
    
Adj. R2 0.6685 0.6700 0.6728 
Note: The dependent variable is the province’s relative per capita transfer from the central 
government.  The number of observations is 209.  Absolute values of t statistics are 
shown in parentheses. 
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